University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1990

Some Current Tax Aspects of Foreign Investment in US
Businesses
Joseph Isenbergh

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph Isenbergh, "Some Current Tax Aspects of Foreign Investment in US Businesses," 68 Taxes - The
Tax Magazine 1126 (1990).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Some Current Tax Aspects of
Foreign Investment in U.S.
Businesses

By Joseph Isenbergh
The University of Chicago Law School
If the question be asked, Where is the largest number of international tax questions of concern to U.S. tax
lawyers likely to arise in the next decade? the answer is
almost surely: investment by foreigners in U.S. businesses. The reason is simple: they have more money. For
every dollar leaving the United States to navigate the
shoals of the separate limitation baskets, Subpart F,
Code Section 367(d), PFICs, and other outbound exotica, there are likely to be two dollars coming in against
the battery of the source rules, FIRPTA, Code Section
338, the reorganization labyrinth, transfer-pricing principles, restraints on interest-stripping, and the branch
profits tax.
Dual Concerns of the U.S. Treasury
The tax environment facing foreign business operations in the United States reflects two ever more conspicuous, and largely conflicting, elements of the U.S.
economic landscape: thirst for tax revenues and thirst
for capital. Perhaps as a reflection of these dual concerns, U.S. taxation of foreign investment is a patchwork of severe and benign provisions.
Passive Investment Versus Active Business. The
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U.S. tax system distinguishes -

and always has -

be-

tween the passive investments and active business operations of foreign persons in the United States. In broad
outline, current flows of U.S.-source passive investment
income - known in tax language as fixed or determinable income not effectively connected with a U.S. trade
or business - are taxed at a flat 30 percent rate without
allowance for deductions, while business profits from
the United States - known as income effectively contaxed at
nected with a U.S. trade or business -are
graduated rates with allowance for the full complement
of deductions and credits.
From this bare outline, it would seem that the U.S.
taxation of passive investment is the more severe. The
highest marginal rates imposed on the net business
incomes of individuals and corporations (33 percent and
34 percent respectively) are only slightly higher than the
flat 30 percent rate imposed on their passive investment
income. The highest effective rate (28 percent at present, but soon to increase to more than 30 percent)
imposed on individuals is lower.
Closer scrutiny reverses this perception. There are
large holes in the flat rate tax imposed on investment
income. Gains from the sale of U.S. investment assets
(other than interests in real property) by foreign persons
are not taxed at all. More important, interest from U.S.
bank deposits and from U.S. "portfolio" debt (a class
including most private and public obligations) is exempt
from U.S. taxation. On the other side of the scales, the
tax on the branch profits of foreign corporations in the
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United States adds a potential extra 30 percent tax on
their business profits when they are removed from the
U.S. economic environment. This tax, dating from the
1986 Act, extends two-level taxation of corporate profits to a larger class of foreign business operations in the
United States.
The overall pattern of U.S. taxation of foreign
persons that emerges from these provisions is relatively
benign taxation of passive investment income (represented mainly by interest and capital gains derived from
financial assets) and more aggressive taxation of active
business profits. This tax regime reflects, I believe, the
combination of the large U.S. appetite for foreign capital that has developed in the last three decades with a
concern over surrendering day-to-day control over economic activity in the United States to foreigners. The
need for foreign capital is the aftermath of American
profligacy, both at home and abroad, that has transformed the United States since World War II from the
world's largest exporter of capital to its largest importer.
The uneasiness over foreign control of U.S. business
assets is a concomitant defensive reaction, a sort of
economic nationalism that recoils at the thought of
being an economic satellite of any other nation. We want
the claims of foreigners to be general (such as bank
deposits, noncontrolling corporate debt, Treasury obligations, etc.) rather than specific (such as waterfront
landmarks, heartland farms, icons of American industry,
etc.).
The difference in tax cost between the two U.S.income tax regimes imposed on foreign persons can be
seen as a sort of tax toll-charge on the exercise of control
over economic activity in the United States. And in this
context the threshold of control is low. An ownership
stake of only 10 percent by a foreign person in a U.S.
enterprise, for example, either as a shareholder or as a
direct owner of equity, is enough to remove the interest
received by the person from the enterprise from the class
of exempt portfolio interest.'

by a network of income tax treaties that extend exemption or lower rates of U.S. taxation to U.S.-source interest, even received by substantial owners of the business
that pays it, and offer significant protection as well to
other types of passive income such as royalties and
dividends. These allowances can be expanded by artfully designed debt and licensing arrangements between
entities created to engage in U.S. business and their
foreign owners. More broadly, the transfer prices between these entities and their owners for the entire range
of factors of production may, to the extent they are
unchecked, bring business profits beyond the reach of
U.S. taxation.
In broad outline, the art of planning over the years
for U.S. operations by foreign persons has been the
conversion of U.S. business profits into a stream of
passive income enjoying some Code-favored or treatyfavored regime. More graphically, it is to shoehorn the
results of active business operations into the form of
passive investments. It is still so, but the game has
recently become more difficult. Two recent developments have tightened the ring around U.S. business
profits by containing their erosion through income tax
treaties and transfer prices. They are, respectively, a
limitation on the practice known as "interest-stripping,"
the deduction of interest that is favored in the hands of
its recipient by an income tax treaty, and a newly increased penalty on understatements of U.S. income resulting from aggressive transfer pricing between U.S.
and foreign persons. The former was adopted in 1989
(and codified as Section 1630) of the Code); the latter
in 1990 (and codified in Section 6662). A provision that
has been looming for some time, but has thus far been
held in check, is a tax on the capital gains of foreign
persons derived from 10 percent or greater ownership
of U.S. enterprises.
What follows here is a discussion of a few pockets
of opportunity and difficulty that have become more
important in light of recent developments in U.S. taxation of foreign investment.

The Boundary Between the Tax Regimes
Hors D'oeuvre: An Old Source Rule
Even these second-level impressions of the U.S.
tax system must be further refined. The actual level of
U.S. taxation of foreign business operations in the
United States is not very high. In recent congressional
proceedings, it was asserted that in 1986 U.S. enterprises under foreign control paid $3 billion of U.S.
income taxes on $500 billion of gross income. 2 I have
no idea of the validity of these numbers, but they are not
wrong by an order of magnitude.
Treaties and Transfer Pricing. U.S. taxation of
the profits of foreign-owned U.S. businesses is blunted
1See IRC Sec. 871(h)(3) (exemption of
"portfolio" interest denied to "10-percent
shareholder").
2 See Tax Notes International, April 18,
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While most foreign business operations in the
United States are undertaken by corporations (and that
is where I shall concentrate here), there is one rather
simple pattern involving foreign individuals that makes
an interesting first course. The age-old source rule for
interest in Section 861(a)(1) and (2) of the Code can
create a favorable tax regime for foreign-owned U.S.
businesses. Under Section 861(a)(1), interest paid by an
individual takes its source from the individual's place
of residence. 3 By virtue of this source rule, income

1990 (Remarks of Sen. Levin)' Total federal
corporate income taxes collected in 1986 were
$63 billion.
3 Under Section 861 (a)(2), interest paid by

nonresident individuals has foreign source,
without regard for their economic activity in
the United States. If the underlying idea is to
identify the (Continued on following page)

1127

derived from U.S. business operations may escape U.S.
taxation through interest deductions arising from what
is essentially the self-owed debt of a foreign individual.
Marcel's U.S. Business. Consider the following
method of acquisition and ownership of a $1 million
business in the United States by a nonresident foreign
individual, whom I shall call Marcel. First, Marcel contributes $1 million to the capital of a wholly-owned
foreign corporation, then borrows back $1 million to
acquire the U.S. business, securing the loan from the
corporation with the U.S. business assets. The interest
Marcel pays to his foreign corporation has foreign
source under the general rule of Section 861(a)(1). As
such it is not exposed to U.S. taxation in the hands of its
recipient (Marcel's foreign corporation) unless it is effectively connected with the conduct by the recipient of
a U.S. trade or business. Marcel's corporation, however
(unlike Marcel), is not itself engaged in a U.S. business.
Merely holding debt secured by property in the United
States does not of itself constitute a U.S. business. 4 And
even if the corporation does have a U.S. business, the
foreign-source interest it receives from Marcel is still
not "effectively connected" unless attributable to the
U.S. office of an active "banking, financing, or similar
business" in the United States. 5 Despite the insulation
of the interest from U.S. tax, the use of U.S. business
assets as security for the loan is sufficient to make the
interest deductible nonetheless from the effectively connected income derived by Marcel from the U.S. business. 6 Thus if the annual net income generated by
Marcel's U.S. business were $200,000, interest of 20
percent on a debt of $1 million would, on paper at least,
eliminate U.S. tax on the profits.
If this result strikes you as too good to be true, you
are right. The interest deduction available to Marcel in
this situation is limited by the regulations on the allocation of expenses to U.S.-source income. The liability
giving rise to the interest cannot exceed 80 percent of
the gross assets of Marcel's U.S. business. 7 Marcel
could therefore deduct interest on $800,000 only. Also,
an interest rate of 20 percent is somewhat aggressive.
Assuming interest of 16 percent on debt of $800,000,
Marcel's greatest usable interest deduction would be
$128,000 annually, still a considerable reduction of U.S.
taxable income that would leave only $72,000 within
the reach of U.S. taxation. Furthermore, that level of
(Note 3 continued) source of income with the
economic activity giving rise to it, this particular source rule is at best an approximation.
Interest can sometimes have an economic center of gravity different from that of the person
who pays it.
4 To reinforce this result, all the formal
elements of creating the loan should occur outgide the United States. It would be helpful as
well if the foreign corporation made other
loans to persons with no activity in the United
States. It probably would not be decisive, however, that the individual shareholder had no
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interest deductions would be more than enough if
Marcel's business produced low earnings during a startup period or created a significant part of its gain in the
form of unrealized appreciation of assets.
Patterns built around the source rule of Section
861(a)(1) can be elaborated in various ways. For example, Marcel may hold the U.S. business and borrow from
his corporation through an interposed grantor trust.8 The
use of a true trust as a vehicle for the U.S. business,
however, would be somewhat hazardous. Because the
determination of the situs of a trust is not an exact
science, a trust engaged in a U.S. business cannot enjoy
the certainty of being a "foreign" trust. And if the trust
turned out not to be a "foreign" trust, the interest it paid
would have U.S. source
and would be exposed to flat9
rate U.S. taxation.
In the form just described, the unadorned useof the
source rule of Section 861(a)(1) as a tax shelter is
doubtless open to attack by the U.S. tax authorities. The
IRS has instruments such as Gregory and Aiken with
which to question the reality and business purpose of the
foreign corporation interposed by Marcel to channel
funds to his U.S. venture. But even in the barest form
the structure may hold up. Marcel's corporation is not a
back-to-back lender and borrower. It owns and retains
the interest it receives from Marcel. If the level of
anxiety of the naked tax shelter is too great, however
(and for responsible readers of this magazine perhaps it
should be), the structure can be strengthened against
attack by enlarging the range of economic activity of
Marcel's foreign corporation. Ideally, it would engage
in actual business- operations somewhere else in the
world, would finance other projects of Marcel, would
lend to venturers other than Marcel, and would borrow
from other sources. Even better would be for this foreign
corporation to have other owners besides Marcel. Instead of engaging in business in the United States
through partnerships, foreign individuals might do better to engage in their own separate businesses in the
United States funded through a jointly-owned foreign
finance corporation.
How It Works. The consequence of the source rule
(which, please remember, applies only to interest paid
by individuals) is the reduction of U.S. taxable income
by the deduction of taxable interest paid by Marcel that
is at the same time excluded from U.S. taxation in the

business activity outside the United States.
5 IRC Sec. 864(c)(4)(B)(ii).
6 Under the temporary regulations on interest allocation, "interest expense incurred by a
nonresident alien shall be considered to be
connected with income effectively connected
with a United States trade or business.. . to the
extent that interest expense is incurred with
respect to liabilities that [are] secured by assets
that generate such effectively connected income." Reg. § 1.861-9T(d)(2)(i).
7"Interest ...is not considered to be connected with effectively connected income to

the extent that it is incurred with respect to
liabilities that exceed 80 percent of the gross
assets of the United States trade or business."
Reg. § 1.861-9T(d)(2)(ii)(A).
8 See Masek, "Foreign Investors: Using a
U.S. Grantor Trust," 45 Business Lawyer 539
(1990).
9It is possible-even likely--that under
the attribution rules of Section 871(h)(3) the
interest would be treated as received by a "10percent shareholder" of the U.S. trust, which
would deny it the character of exempt "portfolio" interest.
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hands of its immediate recipient, a person related to
Marcel. This maneuver is known in the tax lexicon as
"interest-stripping." A more familiar form of intereststripping is built around the use of corporations chartered in treaty countries to gain exemption from U.S. tax
on interest. Because this type of structure offers foreign
investors in search of shelter the additional comfort of
treaty protection along with the limited liability and
potential anonymity of the corporate form, the possibilities for individuals of the source rule of Section
861(a)(1) have not yet (I think) been widely cultivated.
With the recent narrowing of the possibilities of treatyshopping and interest-stripping through foreign corporations, however, tax averse foreign individuals may
find the simple source rule for interest to be their last
best avenue.
I do not expect this possibility to last forever.
Assuming that at least some structures built around the
source rule of Section 861(a) will hold up against attack
by the IRS, it is unlikely that Congress will leave it
alone. One way to end the game would be to assign U.S.
source to interest attributable to the operations of a U.S.
business or on debt secured by U.S. assets. The first of
these changes is in effect what Section 884(0 (added to
the Code in 1986) has already done for interest paid by
foreign corporations.A less drastic change sufficient to
douse Marcel's shelter would be to assign U.S. source
on certain debts between related persons. To have left
the source rule for interest paid by individuals untouched in 1986 was more likely a congressional oversight than a decision of policy to let the United States
serve as a tax haven for business operations carried out
by foreign individuals.
Foreign Corporations
Despite the enticing possibilities of Section
861(a), most foreign investment in U.S. business operations is pursued by enterprises organized as corporations. Given that, there are several different ways to
initiate or acquire U.S. business operations. A foreign
corporation can, for example, bring an existing business
to the United States, or acquire an operating U.S. business, or start business operations in the United States
from the ground up. Different forms of organization are
possible for all such undertakings. A foreign corporation
can act directly in the United States through a branch
business in the United States, a separate corporate entity
chartered in the United States, an entity chartered in the
initiating corporation's own country of incorporation,
or an entity chartered in some third country. And there
are different modes of acquisition. A foreign corporation may purchase the assets or the stock of a U.S.

10 A "qualified resident" of a treaty country
is a corporation that is a resident of that country, unless it is not beneficially owned (50
percent or more) by individual residents of that
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enterprise with cash. Or it may fund the acquisition of
assets or stock with its own stock or securities.
All combinations of acquisition, business activity,
and form of organization raise their own specific questions of U.S. taxation.
Branch Versus Subsidiary Today
Until the 1986 Act, a direct U.S. branch business
of a foreign corporation often enjoyed the most favorable U.S. tax regime. Under the old "50-percent rule,"
when there was no available treaty protection, a branch
offered the best chance of removing business earnings
from the United States without any additional layer of
U.S. tax. When a treaty exempted distributions from a
corporation chartered in the treaty country from any
further U.S. tax (i.e., the so-called second tax on dividends), a separately incorporated foreign subsidiary
would serve as well as a branch. A separate U.S. subsidiary generally fared less well.
The Branch Profits Tax Pacified. The adoption
of the branch profits tax in 1986 had as one of its goals
to equalize the U.S. tax treatment of foreign branches
and foreign and U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations by exposing the earnings of all three to the same
two levels of U.S. tax. Things have not quite worked out
that way, and foreign branches and subsidiaries still
retain a slightly different tax profile from U.S. subsidiaries. Section 884(e)(2)(A) scales down the branch profits tax imposed on "qualified resident" corporations of
a foreign country to the lowest rate of U.S. tax imposed
on dividends under the treaty with the foreign county. 10
The regulations on the subject go further, and eliminate
the branch profits tax altogether for corporations chartered in countries whose treaties with the United States
prevent the imposition of U.S. tax on dividends from
corporations chartered in those countries.11 Under this
regulation the branch profits tax rate for a significant
class of corporations chartered in the majority of the
treaty partners of the United States is zero. In this
regime the foreign branch and foreign-incorporated
subsidiary fare better than a U.S. subsidiary, which may
face a U.S. withholding tax when it distributes dividends to its foreign parent. This situation will persist
until the next generation of treaties
accommodating the
2
branch profits tax is negotiated.'
Special Considerations for Treaty-Shopping.
When a foreign corporation is not a qualified resident
of a treaty country, and the relevant treaty with the
United States contains no limitation on benefits, a U.S.chartered subsidiary may indeed a better vehicle for a
U.S. business. Dividends from it to its foreign parent
may enjoy a reduced rate of U.S. tax under a treaty, even

country or U.S. citizens. Certain publicly
traded corporations and others are also qualified residents. IRC Sec. 884(e)(4).
1I Reg. § 1.884-1T(h)(4)(i)(B).

12 The most recently negotiated treaties
with France and Germany provide for the imposition of the branch profits tax at the lowest
rate imposed on dividends.
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if the recipient of the dividends is not beneficially
owned by residents of the treaty country. One can derive
from this pattern the broad (and somewhat oversimplified) rule of thumb that treaty-shopping structures built
around a business with a U.S. permanent establishment
may work best if the first level of ownership is a U.S.
corporation.
Bringing a Ready-Made Business to the
United States
One way to engage in U.S. business operations is
to bring pre-existing business assets to the United
States. If a U.S. corporation is the chosen-form for the
venture, a hazard that may not be obvious from a foreign
perspective is that of exposing previously accrued but
unrealized gains to U.S. taxation when business assets,
especially intangible property, are brought within the
U.S. tax environment. For example, the transfer of intangible property to a newly formed U.S. corporation in
exchange for its stock - a nonrecognition transaction
under Section 351 - may prove costly. The asset comes
into the corporation with a carryover basis, probably
low, and the stock of the U.S. corporation takes the same
low basis in the hands of the transferor. Since the repeal
of the General Utilities principle, unrealized appreciation brought into a U.S. corporation cannot be removed
from it without tax even though the gain has its eco13
nomic origins outside the United States.
One possible solution to the problem is a licensing
arrangement between the foreign parent and U.S. subsidiary that generates deductible payments from the
stream of U.S. income while keeping the value of the
underlying intangible property beyond the U.S.
Treasury's reach. This pattern is obviously more promising when royalties from the United States enjoy treaty
protection in the hands of the foreign parent..
Flunking Section 351
When licensing is not suitable, foreign investors
have every reason to avoid complying with Section
351's requirements for nonrecognition. In this regard
the changes made in Section 351 by the 1989 Act are
helpful to foreign investors. The receipt of debt securities in exchange for assets transferred to a corporation
is now the occasion for recognition of gain by the
transferor and the restatement of the basis of the assets.
Gain recognized by a foreign person upon the transfer
of business assets to a U.S. corporation normally escapes U.S. taxation, while the restated basis of the asset
will bring enhanced capital recovery in the United
13 If the proposed tax on capital gains of
foreign persons from the sale of stock of U.S.
corporations were ever adopted, the low basis
in the shares would be the occasion for yet
another layer of U.S. tax upon the unwinding
of the venture. One reason a foreign investor
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States. With intangible -property other than good will,
this may be so even if it has already been used in a U.S.
business.14
The Power of Debt
Even more important, the capital structure of the
U.S. corporation will include debt, often the most powerful instrument for'pacifying U.S. taxation when it
permits the reduction of income exposed to U.S. taxation by interest payments that do not attract U.S. tax in
the hands of the recipients. This possibility arises most
commonly when the owner of the U.S. corporation can
benefits from an income tax treaty exempting interest
from U.S. taxation in its hands. When the foreign investor resides or is chartered in a in a country with which
the United States has an appropriate treaty, escape from
U.S. taxation is straightforward. When the investor is
not indigenously connected with a suitable treaty country, a widely followed practice is to channel U.S. business investment through an entity that is itself chartered
in a suitable treaty country. The treaty-sheltered income
is then passed to its beneficial by successive or "backto-back" debt obligations. Variants of this pattern arise
even when the investor also resides in a treaty country
if, for example, a treaty "borrowed" from another country is more favorable or if the country of residence taxes
interest from abroad more severely than the intermediate treaty country.
The channeling of interest deducted from U.S.
taxable income through a treaty-favored entity is a form
of "interest-stripping." Some of the structures used to
this end have colorful names, like the obsolescent
"Dutch Sandwich." The U.S. Treasury, on its side, has
a growing arsenal of countermeasures, along with old
stand-bys like the Gregory and Aiken cases,' 5 to resist
the more blatant forms of treaty-shopping built around
back-to-back debt. Provisions specifically limiting the
deflection of treaty benefits to persons with no ties to
the treaty countries are slowly filtering the network of
U.S. income tax treaties.
Interest-Stripping Rules - Section 163(j)
The 1989 Act brought a specific statutory restriction on interest-stripping in the form of new Section
1630). The heading of Section 1630) ("Limitation on
Deduction for Certain Interest Paid by Corporation to
Related Person") gives a rough picture of its operation.
Section 163(j) does not deny treaty benefits directly, but
limits other tax benefits that would otherwise follow
from the payment of interest favored by an income tax

might overlook this hazard is that in many
foreign income tax systems assets bring with
them a fair market basis when they are transferred by a foreign person to a domestically
chartered corporation.
14 See IRC Sec. 865(a). Recognized gain

attributable to U.S. -amortization allowance,
however, must be recovered as U.S.-source
income. See IRC Sec. 865(c), (d)(4).
15Gregoryv. Helvering, 35-1 USTC 9043,
293 U.S. 465 (1935); Aiken Industries v. Com.,
CCH Dec. 30,912, 56 TC 925 (1971).
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such interest. ' 16 "Excess interest expense" (putting off
a more precise explanation for a bit) is interest expense
that is high in relation to income. 17 Interest disallowed
as a deduction under Section 163(j)(1)(A) is carried
over as disqualified interest to the following taxable
year. If there is no excess interest expense in the following year (taking into account the carryover) disqualified
interest carried forward may be deducted in that year.

excess of taxable interest received. 20 "Adjusted taxable
income" is taxable income determined without regard
to deductible net interest, loss carryforwards, and depreciation, along with other adjustments to be provided in
regulations.2 1 This amount is roughly comparable to
what an accountant might call cash flow from operations. A corporation's "excess limitation" is the excess
of 50 percent of the corporation's adjusted taxable income over its net interest expense. 22 An excess limitation is in effect a shortfall of net interest expense below
the limit of deductibility of disqualified interest. An
excess limitation is not wasted, but carries forward -for
three years, during which it creates room for the deduction of disqualified interest. 23 The consequence of excess limitation carryforwards is an averaging over four
years of the amount of adjusted taxable income available to shelter interest paid to related persons.
Excess interest is matched first with disqualified
interest (rather than prorated or traced in some other
way), so that the deduction of interest paid to related
persons is the first to be disallowed whenever there is
excess interest expense. Section 1630) thus cannot be
avoided simply by taking on debt to unrelated persons,
without also reducing debt to affiliates.

Threshold Capital Structure

Application to Treaty-Favored Interest

A corporation is subject to the limitation of Section
1630) if, first, it has excess interest expense and, second, its ratio of debt to equity exceeds 1.5 to 1.18 Section
1630) is thus built around the threshold of a 3 to 2
debt-equity ratio. Formally, the limitations on intereststripping operate only if the threshold is crossed. If,
however, essential features of a corporation's debt are
distorted to keep its capital structure within .the threshold (for example by paying abnormally high interest on
a small principal amount), the capital structure is vulnerable to attack independently of Section 163(j) under
broader debt-equity principles.

Section 1630) specifically casts interest exempted
from U.S. taxation in whole or in part under an income
tax treaty as disqualified interest. If the interest is
wholly exempt under a treaty, it is disqualified interest
in its entirety. If it is subject to a reduced rate of U.S.
tax, then it is treated as untaxed interest in the same
proportion as the tax reduction under the treaty bears to
the nontreaty rate of U.S. tax. 24 Thus if the treaty rate is
20 percent, one-third of the interest paid to an affiliate
taxed at this rate is untaxed interest (because the ratio
of the percentage points of rate reduction - 10 percent

treaty. Section 1630) reaches interest-stripping deductions from a stream of income otherwise exposed to U.S.
taxation whether the interest payments are deflected to
a tax-haven environment or are exposed to high foreign
taxes where they finally come to rest.
The Basic Pattern of Section 163(j)
Disqualified Interest

-

Section 1630) disallows the deduction, by corporations with capital structures relatively high in debt, of
"disqualified interest," to the extent of the corporations'
"excess interest expense for the taxable year." "Disqualified interest" is defined in turn in Section 163(j)(3)(A)
as "any interest paid or accrued ... to a related person
if no [U.S. income] tax is imposed ... with respect to

-

over the nontreaty rate -

30 percent

-

is one-

third).
Excess Interest Expense and Other
Section 163(j) Fauna
"Excess interest expense," the central operative
element of Section 163(j), is defined as "the excess ...
of the corporation's net interest expense, over ...the
sum of 50 percent of the adjusted taxable income of the
corporation plus- any excess limitation carryforward .

"..."19

In the Code, one good definition deserves another.
"Net interest expense" is the amount of interest paid in
16 A "related person" is defined for this
purpose as in Section 267(b). IRC Sec.
163(j)(4). The determination whether interest
paid to a partnership or other flow-through
entity is disqualified interest is made "at the
partner level." IRC Sec. 163(j)(5)(A).
17 IRC Sec. 162(j)(2)(B). Without the addi-
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Scope of Section 163(j)
Section 1630) reaches far more than treaty tax
haven structures. While it obviously serves to curb
treaty-shopping, it limits as well the extent to which
treaties can reduce the base of U.S. taxation in situations
where only high-tax jurisdictions are involved. "Disqualified interest" is interest not exposed to U.S. taxation in the hands of its recipient. Its exposure to high or
low foreign taxation is irrelevant. Section 1630) thus

tional limitation of excess interest expense,
Section 1630) would eliminate the deduction
of virtually all interest paid to an exempt or
foreign affiliate.
1 IRC Sec. 163(j)(2)(A).
'9 IRC Sec. 163(j)(2)(13)(i).
20 IRC Sec. 1630j)(6)(A). Note that the en-

tire interest expense of a corporation that receives only tax-exempt interest is net interest.
21 IRC Sec. 163(j)(6)(B).
22 IRC Sec. 163(j)(2)(B)(iii).
23 IRC Sec. 163(j)(2)(B)(ii).
24 IRC Sec. 163j)(5)(B).
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serves to limit the concession made through treaties by
the United States to foreign treasuries of all countries.
Debt and Equity. Still unresolved are the standards for determining the debt-equity ratios of corporations paying disqualified interest. How, for example, is
equity to be measured? By the fair market value of
assets or their book value? In the analysis of debt and
equity under Section 385, the relevant amount is the
value of assets at the time the debt is created. To put it
somewhat differently, debt does not change its spots as
the fortunes of an enterprise ebb and flow. 25 In the
context of Section 163(j), however, it may not be so. The
American Bar Association, in a report on the earningsstripping rules, has urged the IRS to allow corporations
to use the fair market value of their assets to determine
debt-equity ratios, including those of corporations acquired in nonrecognition transactions or purchased in
taxable transactions where elections under Section 338
have not been made. 26 Only time will tell.
What Section 163(j) Means
The basic arithmetic of Section 1630) is that the
portion of the business income of a corporation that can
be sheltered from U.S. taxation by the deduction of
interest paid to affiliates is limited to roughly half of its
taxable profit. In the venture described above undertaken by a foreign individual (Marcel) interest on debt
equal to 80 percent of the total invested capital might be
shielded from U.S. taxation by the favorable source rule
of Section 861(a)(1). If Marcel were instead to use a
U.S. corporation held by a Dutch finance corporation,
only half of the adjusted taxable income from the U.S.
venture could be deflected through interest deductions.
For example, the U.S. business generating $200,000 of
net income annually could be capitalized with $600,000
of debt at 16-2/3 percent interest, which would create
27
$100,000 of annual interest deductions.
One final point. Section 163(j) limits the deflection
of income from the U.S. tax environment to tax havens
through structures built around accommodative tax treaties. It does more, though. As noted above, Section
163(j) reaches interest-stripping deductions from a
stream of income otherwise exposed to U.S. taxation
whether the interest payments are deflected to a taxhaven environment or are exposed to high foreign taxes
where they finally come to rest.
It Could -

and May

-

Be Worse

The numbers just canvassed reveal that while Section 163(j)'s limits on interest-stripping have'some bite,
25 See, e.g., Fin Hay Realty, 68-2 USTC
9438, 398 F.2d 694 (CA-3 1968).
26 See Daily Tax Report, April 4, 1990, at
g-5.
27 Note further that depreciation is not separately identified in this example. Marcel's
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they are not crushing. Section 163(j), however, is the
sort of provision that can be made fiercer simply by
changing a few numbers. Moreover, Section 1630) need
not in the future operate with the same force against
international transactions as domestic ones, or against
tax haven operations as the more highly taxed. The
deduction for interest paid with treaty protection can
easily be curtailed more severely than excess interest
generally. I think it likely that in the future the restraint
of Section 1630) on foreign-owned business operations
in the United States will be tightened.
Acquiring an Existing U.S. Business
by Purchase
Another way to engage in business operations in
the United States is to acquire a U.S. business readymade. When the medium of acquisition is money, the
direct acquisition of the assets of a business normally
has the best and simplest tax corollaries for a foreign
buyer. The basis of the assets will reflect the full amount
invested, and many of the liabilities that may lie concealed within an entity acquired intact are purged.
Stock Acquisitions
For a host of business reasons, it is frequently
difficult or impossible to acquire the assets of a business
directly. The assets of the acquired enterprise may be
uniquely tied to a specific corporate charter. Or the only
possible acquisition of a publicly-held company may be
through a hostile purchase of its stock over the objections of its managers. The tax regime affecting stock
purchases is more complex, and various burdens of U.S.
taxation may be shifted to an unwary foreign buyer.
Section 338(a)
The provision of greatest import on purchases of
corporations is Section 338, the current incarnation of
the old Kimball-Diamondrule. Under Section 338(a) a
corporation that has purchased 80 percent or more of the
stock of another corporation may elect to restate the
basis of the target's assets to an amount corresponding
to the purchase price, but at the cost of recognition of
gain by the target corporation. When the stock of a target
corporation is purchased from individual shareholders,
the purchasing corporation's decision to make an election under Section 338(a) depends on whether the tax
advantage of a restated asset basis exceeds the tax cost
of immediate recognition of gain and loss.

business venture may for example be built
around leases into which depreciation does not
enter. If, however, there were depreciation of
$100,000, the adjusted taxable income would
be sufficient to absorb interest expense of
$150,000. At the limit this would permit

$900,000 of debt yielding 16-2/3 percent.
While Section 1630) would not literally stand
in the way, broader principles of debt and equity would make this capital structure unbearably hazardous.
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Section 338(h)(10)
The election of Section 338(a) is only rarely useful
after the purchase of one corporation from another corporation because it brings with it an additional layer of
corporate-level tax along with any gain recognized upon
the sale of shares by the seller. In this situation, the more
apposite election is that of Section 338(h)(10), under
which the selling corporation and the buyer can elect
jointly to treat the stock sale much as though it had been
an asset sale. That is, the assets of the purchased corporation take a basis equal to the purchase price of the
stock and the selling corporation recognizes the gain or
loss resulting from the election, determined as though it
had sold the assets of the purchased corporation instead
of its stock.
A foreign buyer of the shares of a U.S. corporation
would normally want a election under Section
338(h)(10), which brings with it much the same tax
aftermath as an asset purchase. The seller will resist the
election when an asset sale brings a greater tax cost than
a stock sale. What ultimately happens will depend on
the relative gains and losses to the buyer and seller and
will in any event be reflected in the terms of the sale.
When the basis of the stock in the hands of the selling
corporation is roughly the same as the acquired
corporation's basis in its assets - a situation that frequently arises within a consolidated group - an election under Section 338(h)(10) is strongly indicated.
The Seller Has a Loss on the Sale of Target
Shares. When the selling group has a loss built into the
shares of the target corporation, an election under Section 338(h)(10) is generally unpromising. Suppose, for
example, that the value of a subsidiary acquired by a
U.S. corporation for $10 million has declined in value
to $5 million and the subsidiary's assets have a basis of
$1 million. This might be an enterprise acquired by its
U.S. parent at the height of the recent merger frenzy that
has suffered an erosion of the value of its once richly
capitalized good will.
A foreign corporation buying the business would
certainly want to have a $5 million basis in its assets,
especially if they are depreciable. The U.S. seller, in
contrast, would not likely want to make an election that
transformed a $5 million recognized loss for into a $4
million taxable gain. It is thus an unlikely situation for
an election under Section 338(h)(10).
Regulation § 1.1502-20T. A recent development
in the consolidated return regulations, however, may
make the election somewhat less unlikely. Under Temp.
Reg. § 1.1502-20T, adopted in March 1990, "no deduction is allowed for any loss recognized by a member
with respect to the disposition of stock of a subsidiary."
A U.S. seller denied a deductible loss in this situation

28 The selling group may have losses overall that would permit it to offset the gain resulting from the election. If the seller can derive
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has less to lose by entering into an election under Section 338(h)(10). Depending on the overall tax situation
of the selling group, a relatively small increase in the
purchase price offered by the buyer may be sufficient
28
inducement for the seller's agreeing to the election.
Acquisitions of Stock for Stock
The other main method of acquisition is with stock,
in a merger or similar transaction. Acquisitions of this
type involving only U.S. corporations normally entail
no recognition of gain either by the acquired corpora-,
tion or its shareholders. When the acquiring corporation
is foreign, however, recognition is the norm under the
family of special rules of Section 367, which generally
casts as recognition transactions the common patterns
of acquisition of U.S. corporations by foreign corporations - statutory mergers under foreign law, acquisitions of assets for stock, and exchanges of stock for
stock).
Possibilities of Nonrecognition
Some pockets of nonrecognition survive the limitations of Section 367, including a significant class of
stock-for-stock "B" reorganizations. Under temporary
regulations issued in 1986, certain transfers of stock by
a U.S. person to a foreign corporation may escape recognition of gain. 29 Greater possibilities
of nonrecogni0
tion are allowed in Notice 87-85.3
Generally, nonrecognition of gain depends on how
much stock the U.S. transferors own in the acquiring
foreign corporation. A U.S. transferor who receives less
than 5 percent of the voting power and value of the
acquiring foreign corporation does not recognize gain
on the transfer and need not enter into an agreement with
the IRS. If U.S. transferors in the aggregate receive less
than 50 percent of the voting power and value of the
acquiring foreign corporation, even a U.S. transferor
who owns 5 percent or more does not recognize gain,
but must enter into an agreement with the IRS to the
effect that if the acquiring foreign corporation disposes
of the acquired stock within five years of the acquisition, the U.S. transferor will then recognize the gain
realized upon the original transfer of stock (or a part of
the gain reflecting the proportion of the acquired stock
subsequently transferred). If U.S. transferors in the aggregate own more than 50 percent of the voting power
and value of the acquiring foreign corporation, a U.S.
transferor who owns 5 percent or more does not recognize gain on condition of entering into a 10-year agreement to recognize gain upon the subsequent disposition
of the acquired stock by the acquiring corporation.
Recognition of gain is always required, however,

no tax benefit from the sale of the shares in any
event, this may be a tolerable result.

29
30

Reg. § 1.367(a)-3T(f).
1987-2 CB 395.
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upon transfers of shares of a controlled foreign corporation by a U.S. shareholder, unless the shares received.
in exchange are also those of a controlled foreign corporation of which the transferor is a U.S. shareholder.
And recognition is required as well by a U.S. transferor
that owns more than fifty percent of the voting power or
value of the transferee foreign corporation after the
exchange.
What this means in sum is that the acquisition of a
publicly traded corporation with widely. distributed
ownership by U.S. persons can be carried out fairly
easily as a "B" stock-for-stock exchange without recognition of gain, assuming of course that all the other
requirements of Section 368(a)(1)(B) are met. Other
forms of acquisition for stock of the acquiring company
(mergers and asset acquisitions) are occasions for recognition of gain.. From the perspective of a foreign
acquiror, recognition of gain by the sellers of a U.S.
business may be entirely tolerable, even desirable, if it
brings a restated basis in the assets of the business. The
tax cost of recognition of gain by the sellers may be a
deterrent to the transaction at the threshold, however.
Acquiring a U.S. Business with
Non-U.S. Assets
A possible problem for a foreign corporation having recently acquired a U.S. corporation is that the U.S.
enterprise may have its own foreign (i.e., non-U.S.)
operations. To the extent that the foreign operations are
held by a U.S. corporation, they are exposed to U.S.
worldwide taxation. If they are held in controlled foreign corporations of the U.S. entity, non-U.S. holdings
bring with them the whole skein of U.S. tax provisions
affecting outbound transactions-Subpart F, the foreign
tax credit, the limitation baskets, deemed paid taxes
under Section 902. For as long as ownership of these
assets is channeled through a U.S. corporation, even
though their new beneficial owners are entirely foreign,
they will be haunted by U.S. taxation. Future intrusions
of the U.S: tax system can be put to rest only if formal
ownership of the -non-U.S. assets no longer involves a
U.S. entity.
It is therefore often desirable to detach the nonU.S. assets of a newly acquired U.S. enterprise from the
U.S. tax environment. The difficulty of doing so without
significant tax cost underscores the advantage at the
outset of acquiring the assets rather than the stock of a
U.S. enterprise. If acquired assets include foreign
branch businesses or the stock of controlled foreign

31 For this purpose an election under Section 338(h)(10) is the equivalent of an asset
purchase, because it brings with it an acquired
corporation with no earnings and profits and
with assets that have a basis equal to the purchase price. An immediate distribution of the
foreign assets would entail neither corporatelevel nor shareholder-level gain.
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corporations, they are, once directly in foreign hands,
beyond the reach of the U.S. Treasury. When the stock
of a U.S. corporation is acquired, at least one and possibly two additional layers of U.S taxation may follow
the removal of foreign assets from the U.S. tax environ3
ment. '
There Are Foreign Branches
If the acquired corporation has foreign branches, a
distribution to the new owner brings U.S. tax to the
distributing corporation under Section 311 (d) and to the
recipient (as a dividend) under Section 881.32 A partial
liquidation offers no advantage when the recipient of
assets is a corporation. If the stock of the U.S. enterprise
was acquired by purchase, no tax-free spin-off can occur
for five years. 33 If the initial acquisition was tax-free
(the only serious possibility being a stock-for-stock "B"
reorganization), the transfer of the foreign assets to a
foreign corporation is unlikely to escape the combined
battery of Sections 367(a) and 367(d). Any recognition
with
of gain in this step is likely to doom compliance 34
the active business requirement of Section 355(b).
If the first leg of a spin-off (the creation of a
controlled subsidiary) did manage to avoid recognition
of gain, the distribution of the stock of the newly formed
foreign corporation would be taxed under Section
367(e)(1). The recent temporary regulations issued in
January 1990 under Section 367(e)(1) require recognition virtually across the board by U.S. corporations that
distribute the stock of subsidiaries to foreign shareholders, even when all the requirements of Section 355 are
otherwise met. 35 Until the issuance of these regulations,
the gain recognized by the distributing corporation
could be limited to that required by Section 1248(f), i.e.,
the post-1962 earnings of the foreign subsidiary. Under
the regulations, the entire gain (including any attributable to unrealized appreciation in the underlying assets
of the foreign subsidiary) is recognized by the distributing corporation. The only saving feature of the regulations is that is the foreign shareholder may escape
dividend taxation if the distribution meets all the requirements of Section 355.36
There Are Foreign Subsidiaries
If the foreign assets are held in foreign subsidiaries
of the acquired U.S. corporation, the difficulties are
different. If, for example, the U.S. corporation was
acquired in a nonrecognition transaction, a spin-off of

32 An election under Section 338(a), when
available, may have the effect of purging the
acquired U.S. corporation of earnings and profits, but at the cost of recognition of gain on all
the assets of the acquired corporation.
33 Under Section 355(b)(2)(D), a corporation acquired in a recognition transaction by
another corporation is treated as not engaged

in an active business for a period of five years.
34 Under Section 355(b)(2)(C), a corporation is not engaged in an active if the trade or
business was acquired within five years in a
transaction in which gain was recognized.
35 Reg. § 1.367(e)-iT.
36 Reg. § 1.367(e)-IT(b)(1).

TAXES/December 1990

the foreign subsidiary may be possible with only one
level of U.S. tax (to the distributing corporation under
Section 367(e)) imposed on the subsidiary's
previously
37
untaxed earnings and unrealized gains.
After a purchase of the shares of the U.S. corporation, a distribution of its foreign subsidiaries to its
foreign purchaser entails two levels of U.S. tax. Several
of the income tax treaties of the United States bring the
rate of tax on the dividend distribution received by the
foreign corporation to 5 or 10 percent, but that percentage applies to the entire value of the distribution if the
acquired U.S. corporation has sufficient earnings and
profits. There is thus no easy way to avoid an immediate
U.S. tax toll charge as the price of detaching non-U.S.
assets of a U:S. corporation from the U.S. tax environment.
I can think of one measure - of desperation really
-that
may succeed in deferring the U.S. tax toll
charge. It is aggressive, and most readers of this magazine would do well to stop reading here. No guarantees
are offered.
Suppose that a U.S. corporation ("T") recently
acquired by a foreign corporation ("F") holds its foreign
operations in a first-tier controlled foreign subsidiary
("CFC 1"). For the reasons just canvassed, a distribution
of CFC I's shares would entail immediate U.S. taxation,
as would its combination through some sort of merger
with a subsidiary of its new foreign grandparent, F. If,
however, F has a subsidiary ("FS") chartered in an
appropriate country, with assets exceeding the value of
the assets of CFC 1, an acquisition of the assets of CFC 1
by this foreign corporation offers a somewhat complicated detour, suggested by the regulations under Section
367(b). First, CFCl (the controlled foreign subsidiary)
transfers its assets to a newly formed second-tier foreign
subsidiary ("CFC2"). FS then acquires the assets of
CFC2 for somewhat less than half of the shares of its
own voting stock, which CFC2 distributes in liquidation
to CFC1. The foreign assets of the U.S. enterprise are
Secnow "decontrolled," while the regulations under 38
tion 367(b) require no current recognition of gain.
There are, to be sure, a number of difficult corollaries. Gain exposed to U.S. taxation remains etched in
the accounts of CFC1, and CFCl's holdings of FS stock
37 If, however, the tax-free acquisition left
former U.S. shareholders of the acquired U.S.
corporation with amounts of stock of the acquiring foreign corporation that exceed the 5and 50- thresholds of Notice 87-85, it is not
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make FS a "noncontrolled Section 902 corporation"
(known colloquially as a 10/50 foreign subsidiary of T).
Future dividends from FS to CFC1 will attract U.S. tax.
And there is a continuing interest in non-U.S. assets held
by T. Still, if the subsequent earnings of FS are limited
(because for example it is later capitalized with debt
payable to F) the deferral of U.S. taxation upon decontrol may be worth the price. After five years, FS can split
off the assets originally in CFCl and return them to
CFC1 in a foreign corporation exchanged for CFCI's
shares of FS. This transaction appears to escape recognition of gain under Section 367(b). The foreign business assets are now "recontrolled," but not for long. A
spin-off of the stock of CFCl to F will trigger gain to T
under Section 367(e)(1), but not to F.
Conclusion
I offer the scenario of the previous paragraph not
as a practical solution to a recurrent tax problem, but to
illustrate the lengths to which foreign investors in U.S.
businesses must go to avoid the increasingly intrusive
reach of U.S. taxation. The U.S. system of taxation of
inbound business transactions has become nearly as
complex as the taxation of outbound transactions. Ten
years ago, things were different. U.S. taxation of foreign
investment was a more placid affair. Only the unwary
foreigner was likely to bear considerable U.S. tax. Now,
a substantial ownership stake in a U.S. business is far
more closely hemmed in by taxation of gains attributable to U.S. real property, the branch profits tax, and
limitations on the aggressive use of interest-stripping
and transfer pricing. The last component of the emerging new regime - a U.S. tax on capital gains derived
from substantial ownership of U.S. business assets - is
not yet in place, but has been threatening for some time.
I doubt it can be put off much longer, especially as
Americans come to savor the inevitable higher taxes
imposed domestically. It remains to be seen whether
foreign capital can be attracted to the U.S. economy
when its owners are under increasing tax pressure to
leave entrepreneurship behind when they invest in the
M
United States.

clear whether or not a spin-off by the acquired
corporation might ruin the tax-free acquisition
retrospectively. Under Reg. § 1.367(a)3T(g)(7) a disposition "in a transaction on
which gain or loss would not be required under

U.S. income tax principles," does not ruin the
initial acquisition, but where does a disposition
governed by Section 367(e)(1) fall in the spectrum of "U.S. income tax principles"?
38See Reg. § 7.367(b)-7(c)(1)(ii).
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